Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected
axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the
`principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by
notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to
modify or `complete' quantum mechanics.
A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its
proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of
quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum
mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic)
level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose),
with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with
psychology and brain science (H P Stapp).
I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a
subject that, per se, suffers from a very limited understanding that is
even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable,
though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress
desperately needs to join forces.
Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood
theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a
deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of
a classical N-particle system in its 6N-dimensional phase-space.
Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an
external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable
partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum
mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called
measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of
the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to
become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on
`instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement
basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather
than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the
observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may
come in.
Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's
book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new
developments.
The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen
interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and,
eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind
connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous
attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum
mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this
world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new
developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its
possible foundation on quantum mechanics.
The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a
field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics
since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum
ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can
hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture',
which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding.
Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed.
The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation
of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being
partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of
`events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the
Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then
defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid
infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to
the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel',
to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'.
The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a
quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large
macroscopic effects.
On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively
in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of
records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the
universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a
Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The
full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of
relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast
ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.'
The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop.
While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the
intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion,
here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but
gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints.
After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible
worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected
with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation
about the special significance of local properties in our understanding
of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum
correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as
anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality:
the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the
natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum
universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create
meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept:
meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest.
The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires
more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical
physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a
description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within
quantum mechanics.
`The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as
knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.'
`21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical
automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices
can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.'
An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look
at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and
not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an
actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather
it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the
actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that
is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.'
How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did
a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour.
Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our
classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and
measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those
fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether
the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or
requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will
agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we
could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a
deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum
measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly
not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The
experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent
observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called
pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a
matter of free choice.
`The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike
universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big
(quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy
to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp
suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound
alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of
human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far
we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete
research results becoming available to support this view.