Table of contents

Volume 16

Number 2, June 1996

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PAPERS

73

, , , and

Collective dose is described as a measure of the total detriment associated with a specific source or practice, and the collective doses resulting from a number of sources have been assessed. However, the interpretation and use of such estimates, for example in making decisions, has been the subject of much debate. This paper reconsiders collective dose and explores the concerns relating to the use of collective dose estimates that are made up of low levels of individual dose, or extend over long periods of time into the future and are delivered to different populations. Practical solutions are advanced to deal with long timescales with the aim of providing more robust estimates of long-term population detriment for decision making.

81

and

Various sets of tissue weighting factors have been derived for the calculation of the effective dose to children (age groups 0 - 9 and 10 - 19 years) in order to assess the detriment caused by radiation, e.g. in diagnostic radiology. The risk estimates for children have been taken from the recent UNSCEAR 1994 Report.

The paper presents four sets of weighting factors, two including and two not including the risk of hereditary effects. The effective dose is calculated for some investigations common in paediatric diagnostic radiology.

Although the derived weighting factors for children and adolescents differ from those for the whole population, the effective dose value was not dramatically different. When using weighting factors derived for children and adolescents, taking into account both the risk of somatic and hereditary effects, as well as severity, the effective dose differed seldom more than 10% from that calculated with the ICRP weighting factors. Thus, the ICRP weighting factors could also be used for children and adolescents. Age-dependent risk coefficients should, however, be used.

91

, , , and

The physical and chemical properties of plutonium are related to its environmental transfer and uptake by man. Once incorporated, plutonium is avidly retained in the lungs, liver and skeleton, the relevant amounts being determined by its solubility in body fluids. A knowledge of the toxicity of plutonium is largely dependent upon animal studies where exposure to relatively large amounts, compared with those associated with known human exposure, can cause tumours in those tissues where it is retained. With one exception, epidemiological studies have not been able to demonstrate adverse health effects in humans.

Precautions taken in the processing of plutonium have ensured that average intakes by workers have been consistently low. When it has been released to the environment, it has been of little ecological importance and has caused only small doses to man with no observable adverse effects.

The long half-life of plutonium causes anxiety about its storage and disposal, but plutonium is not unique. It is often forgotten that very much larger amounts of permanently toxic elements such as arsenic, cadmium and lead are stored and disposed of with much less concern. Plutonium is a valuable resource and for that reason should not be treated as a waste for disposal into the environment.

107

and

The appearance of the Health Physicist as expert witness has become a regular feature in complex radiation litigation. This article, based on a presentation given at a scientific meeting of the Society for Radiological Protection, examines from the lawyer's perspective the key features of the litigation process and the forces at work in drawing together the disciplines of radiation science and law. The role of the Health Physicist in such litigation is examined and practical examples are given.

115

, and

North Wales has a wide range of levels of natural radioactivity together with significant levels of artificial radionuclides on its coast arising mainly from the Sellafield nuclear processing plant. In situ gamma-ray spectrometry offers a rapid alternative to core sampling for mapping out these radioactivity levels but requires extensive calibration and some knowledge of the depth distribution. Quantitative in situ spectrometry and analysis of core samples was performed for three selected areas of North Wales and their correlation assessed. Despite a non-exponential activity - depth distribution, agreement to within 25% was found for and to within 50% for . Complete agreement was found for within the experimental errors. Environmental dose-rate assessments were also performed using the in situ spectra and showed that was responsible for almost 50% of the external gamma-ray dose-rate at two of the sites. These dose-rate measurements were compared with those obtained from a compensated GM tube and were found to be in complete agreement within the experimental errors.

NOTE

131

All the Letters to the Editor in this issue appear in the same postscript or PDF file.

Contents

Radiation protection: science and value David Sumner Moss Park, Ravenstone, Whithorn DG8 8DR, UK

Radiological protection and science H J Dunster 142 Andrewes House, Barbican, London EC2Y 8BA

The Seascale leukaemia cluster---a plausible cause disproved Clement Oxby Squirrel Walk, Winder, Frizington, Cumbria CA26 3UH, UK

NEWS AND INFORMATION

135

New members

  • Miss C L Ashcroft, DML, Plymouth

  • Mr K-Y Cheung, Prince of Wales Hospital, Shatin, Hong Kong

  • *Mr N Freniere, Hopital Maisonneuve-Rosemont, Montreal, Canada

  • ‡ Mr T S Goktemur, University of Salford

  • Mr J R Jones, Royal Free Hospital, London

  • Ms S B Ross, UKAEA, Dounreay

  • Mr A G Rust, St Luke's Hospital, Guildford

  • Ing W Termorshuizen, Academisch Ziekenhuis Leiden, Netherlands

  • || Dr N J Utting, Assoc. Radiation Protection Services, Suffolk

  • † Mr M T Wright, Scottish Nuclear Ltd

  • * Associate

  • † Graduate Member

  • ‡ Student

  • || Rejoining

Upgradings to member

  • Mr S C Fisher, Radman Associates

  • Mr M G Lyons, Rolls-Royce Nuclear Engineering Services

Deaths

  • Mr M Donegani

  • Mr S Stein

Current membership

*

SRP Founders Prize 1996

Keith Faulkner Dr Faulkner graduated from Imperial College, London, in 1977 with an honours degree in Physics. Keith then opted to study for an MSc in Radiation Physics at the Medical College of St Bartholomew's Hospital. His MSc thesis was on the dosimetry and radiation protection of the Cuarietron, an afterloading machine for Brachytherapy, which had been recently installed at the London Hospital. Dr Faulkner was then offered a post as a Basic Grade Physicist in the Diagnostic Radiology and Radiation Protection Group at the Christie Hospital, Manchester. At this time his interest in research was stimulated and he successfully completed a project on the assessment of computed tomography scanners for which he was awarded a PhD by the University of Manchester. He moved to Newcastle in 1986 to Head the Diagnostic Radiology Physics Group in the Regional Medical Physics Department. Following an internal reorganisation within the Department in 1990, he assumed responsibilities for radiation protection and the bone mineral assessment service.

 

Figure 1. Keith Faulkner

Dr Faulkner has taught diagnostic radiology physics and radiation protection on numerous undergraduate and postgraduate courses to scientists, doctors and dentists. He is an honorary lecturer at Newcastle University and lectures at the Royal College of Surgeons, Ireland, on the United Kingdom's radiation protection legislation. He has supervised six postgraduate student research projects on topics in diagnostic radiology and radiation protection.

During his career Dr Faulkner has achieved an outstanding national and international reputation in the field of radiation protection in hospitals. His main research and development interests lie in the solution of scientific problems in diagnostic radiology and radiation protection. Dr Faulkner has published over 140 publications and given over 150 presentations at scientific meetings of which 80 have been abstracted. He is regularly invited to speak at national and international scientific meetings. Dr Faulkner has edited a number of books on radiation protection and is currently the Honorary Editor (Scientific) of the British Journal of Radiology. Dr Faulkner has successfully completed contract research and other projects on radiation protection for many organisations including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Commission (CEC), research committees, charities and industry.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) recently asked him to act as a short term consultant to the Republic of Korea to advise the National Institute of Health on radiation protection matters. He has contributed to the diagnostic radiology and dental volumes of a soon to be published series of manuals on radiation protection in hospital and general practice which will be published by the WHO on behalf of the WHO, IAEA, CEC, Pan American Health Organisation and the International Labour Organisation. He has recently been asked to draft guidance on radiation protection in interventional radiology, also for the WHO. Dr Faulkner is also a member of the International Electrotechnical Commission's working group on the safety of mammography equipment. Keith is also a member of the Department of Health's Breast Cancer Screening Advisory Committee. He is a Trustee of the LH Gray Trust and the British Institute of Radiology.

136

The German Society for Radiological Protection recently launched a quarterly German language journal Strahlenschutz Praxis aimed at practical aspects of radiological protection. This successful publication has just completed its first year and has launched into 1996 with an edition featuring a number of articles to mark the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl Accident. Previous editions have featured similar in depth discussions of topics such as medical irradiation but there are also a wealth of short communications on topics including practical metrology and topical issues.

136
View article, IAEA

Proceedings Series: Environmental Impact of Radioactive Releases Price: 2480 Austrian Schillings (874 pp., 178 figures) Publication date: January 1996

Proceedings of a symposium held in Vienna, 8--12 May 1995. This was the first major IAEA meeting for more than a decade dealing specifically with the transfer of radionuclides in the environment. Its purpose was to review the information that has become available in recent years, notably as a result of the Chernobyl accident but also gained from studies of the discharges from civil and military nuclear facilities in the early nuclear age. This information has been used for improving the reliability of environmental model predictions, and the main results of the IAEA/CEC programme on Validation of Environmental Model Predictions (VAMP) were presented. In addition, progress in the IAEA programme on the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP) was summarized.

Global impact assessments; New roles for environmental monitoring; Radionuclide releases to the atmosphere; Radionuclide releases to the aquatic environment; Radionuclides in the terrestrial environment; Radionuclide transfer in the freshwater environment; Environmental model testing; Radiological impact assessment; Environmental remediation; Topical discussions.

Available directly from the IAEA, the IAEA agents or your local bookseller. For Canada and the USA, please contact UNIPUB, 4611-F Assembly Drive, Lanham, MD 20706-4391.

136
View article, UK

Department of the Environment

Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee:

Report on: Problems Encountered by Users of Radioactive Materials Outside the Nuclear Industries (Small Users)

The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) has published a follow-up to its 1991 review on the problems encountered by users of small amounts of radioactive substances (termed by the RWMAC `Small Users'). These `Small Users' comprise, in the main, hospitals and universities where radioactive materials are used for medical and research purposes.

The report considers whether the situation, five years on, has changed `For better or for worse?'

The RWMAC remains of the view that, within the context of the accepted policy that the polluter pays, small users should carefully consider their procedures for dealing with radioactive waste to minimise their needs for disposal and to identify, if appropriate in consultation with disposal operators, the most cost-effective routes for disposal.

However, to this end, Small Users require guidance and advice. In the RWMAC's view this should, preferably, be supplied by the Regulators. Therefore, the RWMAC welcomes the establishment of a Liaison Group between Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) and Small Users, which provides a forum for exchange of information and advice. However, the RWMAC recommends that this Group is given a formal national status.

The RWMAC, although recognising that improvements have been made in some areas since its previous report, believes a number of issues remain clearly unsatisfactory and are in need of urgent attention and remedy. The RWMAC's major concerns relate to:

  • inconsistencies with respect to enforcement action taken by HMIP inspectors for supposed breaches in compliance with legislation administered, or authorisations issued by them.

It is recommended that there is a reinstatement of specialist inspectors, rather than the current prevailing use of generalist inspectors, to overview the many complex and diverse processes related to authorisations to use radioactive substances, and for their management and disposal. It is also recommended that regulation by HMIP, and other regulators should be based explicitly on a dose/risk approach.

  • the decreasing number of landfill sites available for the disposal of very low level radioactive waste, and incinerators for the disposal of clinical waste and biological materials.

It is recommended that a central register for these is set up and that Government (through its Agencies) ensures an adequate and geographically appropriate distribution of these disposal facilities. It is also recommended that a review of the legislation concerning the availability of landfill sites should be carried out, and that small users' authorisations should permit disposal to any authorised site or contractor.

  • the high costs being imposed on Small Users with respect to administration related to the use of radioactive substances and the disposal of the waste resulting from their use.

The RWMAC recommends that HMIP reviews urgently its regulatory charges and improves its administrative procedures. The RWMAC also recommends that commercial operators should aim to improve services at the lowest practicable costs, compatible with meeting safety and regulatory standards.

  • the timescales imposed by HMIP for the accumulation and storage of radioactive waste on site. These are considered by the RWMAC to be too restrictive and could be detrimental in both environmental and practical terms.

It is recommended that there should be greater flexibility in the prescribed levels for the accumulation and storage of radioactive waste by Small Users. It is also recommended that HMIP should adopt the practice of requiring disposal to take place `as soon as reasonably practicable', as this would be a flexible but enforceable limitation for the storage of waste.

So with respect to the initial question posed `For better or for worse?', although it is acknowledged that progress has been made, there is still considerable room for improvement. The RWMAC proposes constructive and remedial measures to deal with the issues raised in this report. It is hoped that, if a future review is carried out, when HMIP has been subsumed into the Environment Agency, it will be evident that many of the problems identified in this report will have been addressed.

The independent Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee was set up in response to a recommendation of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution's Sixth Report on Nuclear Power and the Environment. The RWMAC Chairman is Sir Gordon Beveridge, Vice-Chancellor of the Queen's University, Belfast. The RWMAC's terms of reference were revised in July 1991 and are:

  • `To advise the Secretaries of State for the Environment, Scotland and Wales on the technical and environmental implications of major issues concerning the development and implementation of an overall policy for all aspects of the management of civil radioactive waste, including research and development; and on any such matters referred to it by the Secretaries of State.'

Copies of the RWMAC Report, which is published by HMSO, Price £11.00 ISBN No. 0 11 753238 X, can be obtained from: HMSO Publication Centre, PO Box 276, London SW8 5DT.

NRPB

NRPB has recently published another in its Documents series: `Generalised Derived Limits for Radioisotopes of Strontium, Ruthenium, Iodine, Caesium, Plutonium, Americium and Curium'. This takes into account the most recent recommendations of ICRP both in Publication 60 and in recent publications on biokinetics. If environmental concentrations exceed about 10% of a GDL then a site specific dose assessment may be required. More details of the application of GDLs are in a forthcoming publication.

Extrapolation of Dose Response Data for Risk Assessment

A set of discussion papers focusing on cancer risks in human populations is available from the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE). Based on presentations from a meeting entitled `Extrapolation of Dose Response Data for Risk Assessment' held at the Royal Society in 1995, the papers have been published by IChemE as a supplement to the quarterly journal Process Safety and Environmental Protection (PSEP).

The papers review the state of the art in respect of extrapolation of dose response data to determine the way in which low exposure doses are set for the purposes of regulation and precaution against potential health hazards. The authors draw on experience gained in relation to both chemical substances and ionising radiation as the carcinogenic agents.

The topics covered in the supplement are wide ranging within the overall theme of risk assessment. Contributions cover:

  • radiation and genetic stimulation

  • major concerns with quantitative cancer risk assessment for environmental risk management

  • an assessment of the risks to human health associated with exposure dioxins

  • molecular approaches to assess cancer risks

  • classical human epidemiology

Sir Frederick Warner of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment Unit of the University of Essex chaired the meeting and edited the supplement. The authors are leaders in toxicology, epidemiology, radiation science, statistics and risk assessment and are drawn from international academic, industrial and government institutions.

The supplement is aimed at those involved in all aspects of cancer research particularly in the fields of hazard identification and risk assessment, and, in the regulatory context, the setting of acceptable exposure standards.

The PSEP supplement costs £15.00 and is obtainable from David Honeybone, Journal Subscriptions, IChemE, 165--189 Railway Terrace, Rugby CV21 3HQ.

138

The following articles and notes appeared in Radioprotection 31 (1), 1996.

Articles

Individual dosimetry C. Wernli, J. Barthe and G. Dietze

Neutron dosimetry W. G. Alberts, J. M. Bordy, J. L. Chartier, R. Jahr, H. Klein, M. Luszik-Bhadra, F. Posny, H. Schuhmacher and B. R. L. Siebert

Measurement of radon products at the Bouchet site (in French) M. C. Robé, V. Labed, A. Beneito and J. M. Maurel

Notes

Hot particle dosimetry using laser heated thermoluminescence or optical stimulated luminescence (in French) R. Setzkorn, D. Beteille, L. Dusseau, H. Prévost, J. Fesquet and J. Gasiot

Aircrew exposure on board a subsonic aircraft studied with complex dosimetric sets F. Spurny, I. Votockova and J. F. Bottollier-Depois

145

24 - 28 June 1996, Cambridge, UK Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning Enquiries to: Anna Totten, IBC Technical Services Ltd, 57 - 61 Mortimer Street, London W1N 8JX, UK (Tel: 0171 453 2712; Fax: 0171 453 2058)

8 - 12 July 1996, Cambridge, UK RP'96 Seventh European Summer School on Radiological Protection Enquiries to: Emmah Tamlyn, IBC Technical Services Ltd, 57 - 61 Mortimer Street, London W1N 8JX, UK (Tel: 0171 453 2712; Fax: 0171 453 2058)

9 - 12 July 1996, Portsmouth, UK International Workshop on Radiation Exposures by Nuclear Facilities Enquiries to: Dr M Schmidt, University of Portsmouth, Division of Physics, Park Building, King Henry I Street, Portsmouth PO1 2DZ, UK (Tel: 01705 842150; Fax: 01705 842157)

3 - 5 September 1996, Norwich, UK AURPO Annual Scientific Meeting: The Detection of Radiation for Protection Purposes Enquiries to: Dr R Thomas, University Safety Services, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK (Tel: 01603 592199)

1 October 1996, London, UK Communicating Radiological Protection - -The Professionals, The Media and The Public Enquiries to: The Society for Radiological Protection, 148 Buckingham Palace Road, London SW1W 9TR, UK (Tel: 0171 823 4971; Fax: 0171 824 8112)

13 - 17 November 1996, Al-Minia, Egypt Third Radiation Physics Conference Enquiries to: Professor M A Gomaa, Third Radiation Physics Conference, Atomic Energy Authority, 101 Kasr El-Eini St, Cairo, Egypt (Fax: 3540982)

11 - 14 May 1997, Stratford-upon-Avon, UK Health Effects of Low Dose Radiation: Challenges for the 21st Century (call for papers) Enquiries to: Rachel Coninx, BNES, 1 Great George Street, London SW1P 3AA, UK (Fax: 0171 233 1743)

15 - 18 September 1997, Avignon, France Intakes of Radionuclides: Occupational and Public Exposure (call for papers) Enquiries to: Dr H Manzel, EC, DGXII/F/6-T61 1/37, 200 rue de la Loi, B1049 Brussels, Belgium

MEETING REPORTS

138

Royal Lancaster Hotel, London, 29-30 November 1995

The purpose of the conference, organised by IBC Technical Services, was to raise issues concerning the use of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) as a tool for optimising the safety of existing and planned nuclear reactors. A summary of presentations is given below.

An overview of IAEA guidance on the safety assessment of new nuclear installations and those built to earlier safety standards, with particular reference to the use of PSAs, was provided by Friedrich Niehaus (IAEA, Austria). In addition, guidance on the development of safety principles for the design of future nuclear power plants was described.

A view of PSA from a regulator's perspective, specifically that of HM NII, was given by Geoff Grint (Health and Safety Executive). The role of PSA as one part of a plant safety case was outlined and the completeness to which PSA is expected to account for contributions to risk was described. In addition, the usefulness of PSA in support of plant modifications, assessment of maintenance procedures, and for the monitoring of risk over time was described.

The use of PSA based computer programs for use in accident consequence assessment was described by Dr J A Jones (NRPB). These programs model atmospheric dispersion and deposition of radioactive material and calculated doses to the exposed population according to the distribution of radioactivity.

A methodology for the identification and assignment of functions to man and machine was described by Alastair Fewins (NNC Ltd). Two practical examples of the application of the methodology were given.

A structured approach used in the peer review of safety documentation in support of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme (NNPP) for the Ministry of Defence was described by Colin Welsh (Rolls Royce and Associates Ltd).

Key issues concerning the use of PSAs for operating Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) were outlined by Dr Bert Eendebak (N.V. KEMA, The Netherlands). Special attention was given to the use of PSAs for the assessment of NPPs of a standardised type and for the review and selection of proposed modifications for NPPs. Examples were given for two existing NPPs in The Netherlands.

The problems and benefits of formal fire hazard assessment combined with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques were reviewed by Paul Scott (Ove Arup and Partners). In addition the problems of improving fire safety with a limited safety budget were considered. Practical findings in relation to ageing nuclear power plants were detailed and a simple screening methodology to be used prior to a detailed Fire Hazard Analysis was proposed.

A number of `non-nuclear' organisations are in the process of adopting human reliability and human factors analyses in their safety assessments. A procedure for addressing human factors issues through human reliability analysis was given by Bill Gall (DNV Technica) and the link between human factors and safety management was illustrated.

A PSA study was commissioned under the CEC's PHARE programme to assess the level of safety of the reactors at Bohunice V-1, the benefits of modifications which were already committed, and to recommend possible areas for improvement. The scope of the PSA model and the key results obtained were described by Mike Lewis (Electrowatt Engineering Services (UK) Ltd).

BNFL's experience in preparing and implementing effective PSAs for existing nuclear chemical plants at Sellafield was outlined by Alec Bounds (British Nuclear Fuels plc.). The methodologies by which fault identification is achieved and by which fault frequencies and consequences are determined were also described.

Examples were given, by Ian Kempsell (BNFL Engineering Group), of the use of PSAs by BNFL in the planning of decommissioning operations. In the case of an ILW silo, optimum solutions were derived for seismic enhancement and control of a potential hazard for fire. In the case of a second waste silo, the lowest risk crane replacement option was selected.

An overview of NNC's involvement in PSAs and PSA related work on reactors in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was provided by John Walker (NNC Ltd). The purposes of these PSAs include quantification of the safety levels achieved by the plants and the establishment of reliability targets for replacement equipment where there is a need for modification.

The use of PSA codes for the assessment of the environmental consequences of possible accidents at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Hungary) was described by Laszlo Koblinger (KFKI Atomic Energy Research Institute, Hungary).

M Gooding

139

Sheffield, 17 January 1996 (Organised by Central Sheffield University Hospitals NHS Trust)

The first speaker was Martin Murray from HMIP Operations Division, North East Region. He explained that, following Royal Assent to the Environmental Act, the Environmental Agency became a legal entity in August 1995. The Agency will be the single regulatory authority responsible for the enforcement of RSA93 in England and Wales. He outlined the structure within the Agency and reminded delegates that it would recover regulatory costs as HMIP do at present.

During the past year, revised RSA1 and RSA2 forms had been issued and work was currently underway to produce a revised RSA3 form. In all cases HMIP had consulted with IPEMB, AURPO and the Small Users Liaison Group. It is planned that guidance to applicants using the RSA3 form will include not only detailed notes on how to complete the form but also guidance on radiological assessments (as used currently by HMIP's Inspectors).

He stated that, following a court ruling, the Agency must now consider `Justification of Practice'. The ruling stated that HMIP (the Agency) must be satisfied that a practice is justified, on a case-by-case basis, before issuing any registration or authorisation certificates. They must also be satisfied that the 0.3 mSv annual constraint and the 1 mSv annual dose limit will not be exceeded. (One practice that can no longer be considered justified is the use of radionuclides in lightning conductors.) With regard to the use of radionuclides in medical use, the ARSAC licence provides the justification. However, the Agency will still want evidence of `best practice' to ensure doses and waste are kept to a minimum by considering the manner in which the radionuclides are administered and their routes of disposal.

The next speaker, Hugh Abbot from Amersham International, presented a lucid and, at times, amusing, account of the responsibilities of those who are responsible for the disposal of radioactive waste via incinerators. The Environmental Act 1990 states that `people must not be put at risk because of the action or lack of action of others'. It was stressed that anyone who disposes of radioactive waste must know their responsibilities and must decide when, why and how to dispose of it by looking at, for example, the radionuclide energy, the associated risks, the activity and any daughter products.

Assessments should be carried out either by direct measurement, e.g.\ attenuation, or by indirect methods, e.g. the assessment of error bands. Decay should be considered within the context of waste disposal (waste should be streamed by isotope, half-life and radiological hazard) and also as a possible alternative. This alternative should not, however, be considered an easy option as it requires very accurate record keeping and someone to control it. Such control should ensure that strictly controlled distribution with old, out-dated copies withdrawn.

He then stated that whoever is involved in radioactive waste disposal must receive initial and ongoing training which should be recorded. The training should be designed to ensure that the person disposing of the radioactive waste is competent to secure compliance with the authorisations.

The last presentation before coffee was given by Ciaran McDonnell from NRPB. He explained that assessments of radiological hazards are necessary to demonstrate compliance with radiation protection criteria and are required by the legislation (e.g. RSA93, RSA3(88)). He described an NRPB initiative to make more widely available the methodology they use when, as part of their RPA duties, they are asked to carry out assessments. It is similar to that contained within the AURPO guidelines and will contain all the information that a user will need to prepare an assessment. It will, for example, list a range of radionuclides used by `small users', it will assume that no waste is disposed of to land sites and it will include a set of worked examples. It will allow the user to prepare an assessment using nothing more specific than a pocket calculator but will also contain details of the operation of a spreadsheet (presently Lotus 1-2-3). Future developments will include data within Excel and may, subsequently, include data that can be transmitted via E-mail or the Internet. The report is currently with the IPEMB and the AURPO for comment and it is hoped that it will be published by the spring of this year.

Following coffee Christina Cameron from Safe Guard International spoke of arrangements for the disposal of sealed sources. Basically the National Disposal Service operated by UKAEA has disappeared and been replaced by Safeguard International which is a commercial organisation. They look after all aspects of disposal including packaging and transport. Their initial objectives are to improve and streamline their operations including continuing training of staff, development of a database of sources and a QA system which has a twice yearly customer survey. They also aim to simplify the paperwork required to dispose of sealed sources. Simplified arrangements exist for disposal of smoke detectors.

To a rousing cheer, Mike Turnham of the Department of Transport displayed a slide showing the name of the long awaited Radioactive Materials Road Transport Regulations 1995 with the last digit of the year crossed off. To everybody's relief he confirmed that Regulations were due to be laid before Parliament in January 1996 and be in force by 1 March 1996. Many amendments had been accepted as a result of the consultation exercise. Chief amongst them was the removal of `excepted packages' from the remit of Regulations 30 (Marking, Labelling and Placarding) and a 5 year derogation in the UK to dispense with fire extinguishers if carrying less than 10 packages with a total Transport Index lower than 3. Records of contamination measurements and transport documentation needed to be kept for two years, this could be on a computer. Excepted packages needed documentation but vehicles carrying only `excepted' packages do not need placarding. It has also been agreed that vehicles of <3050 kg and capable of carrying < 7 passengers can use smaller placards. It is the responsibility of the carrier (not the driver!) to inform the Secretary of State if an incident occurs. He reiterated that emergency arrangements are in IRR85 and not the Transport Regulations.

Describing ICRP68 which summarises and updates the guidance given in ICRP52, as a framework from which European legislation is derived, Dr Keith Harding from City Hospital NHS Trust presented a pragmatic view on its relevance to practical protection of the patient in Nuclear Medicine. It incorporates the latest health effects and radiological protection thinking of ICRP60. He felt it lacked some of the practical aspects normally found in Nuclear Medicine Departments but mentions some not normally considered. While accepting much of the document's recommendation he was disparaging about several points including advice on administration to pregnant women, e.g.\ give when the bladder is partially full and only give smaller activities, `carers', sterility and PET (it advocates more shielding to protect the patient rather than staff and others).

Next Dr Robert Shields (Manchester Royal Infirmary) reported on the current thinking of a joint working group of BIR, HSE, and NRPB who are reviewing the guidance and advice given to patients who have received radiopharmaceuticals. The advice given in the current (1988) Guidance Notes is based on the doserate limits defined in IRR85: these limits derive from consideration of a radiation worker exposed at constant doserate for 2000 hours per year (40 hours per week) with a dose limit of 15 mSv (the limit for a non-classified worker). This is clearly not a good model for predicting the dose to a patient's family and fellow workers. The Working Group is revising this guidance based on a realistic assessment of actual doses to those concerned: the intention will be to restrict the exposure of members of the public to below 1 mSv (or 5 mSv for `carers and comforters') while at the same time not causing unnecessary anxiety or psychological stress. A review of such realistic doses has shown that there is no hazard from diagnostic procedures (with the exception of 111In leukocytes >10 MBq and some higher activity 131I procedures---the current thinking of the Working Group would set the lower limit for restrictions at 100 MBq). Radioiodine therapy for benign thyroid disease would continue to be available for the treatment of out-patients at activities up to 1000 MBq, above which admission as an in-patient would be advised. It is hoped that firm advice will be published during 1996.

In the last talk before lunch Norine Callan (HSE, Sheffield) gave an account of how the HSE audits the management arrangements for safety in NHS hospitals. The HSE expects to see a positive and forward-looking attitude to the management of radiation safety; this is an explicit requirement of the `Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992'. When conducting an inspection or safety audit, they will be looking not just at the safety record (backward-looking) but also at the management structure in place to ensure that the safety programme is regularly monitored and reviewed. The emphasis is on anticipating and preventing possible incidents. During this current year, the HSE have been concentrating on four topics in particular within the NHS: violence, COSHH, IRR85 and manual handling. Recent safety audits in the South Yorkshire and Humberside area showed a generally mature policy on radiation safety (as would be expected from the long history of strict statutory control within this field) with the successful establishment of Radiation Safety Committees, Local Rules and QA programmes. There tended, however, to be little direct interest or leadership from the Trusts themselves and there was often confusion as to who was responsible for implementing policies. Key recommendations included the review (or writing!) of policies for the safe use of ionising radiations with a clear definition of responsibilities, improved security for mobile x-ray sets, the establishment and monitoring of QA procedures and the monitoring of training and refresher training.

The revision of the Euratom Basic Safety Standards (BSS) Directive and the proposed revision of the Patient Protection Directive were reviewed by Mike Williams (HSE, London). The new BSS Directive was expected to be approved very soon (perhaps in January) and all the UK's major negotiating points had been achieved. Consultation was now starting on the implementation of the revised directive. It is proposed to hold comprehensive, but informal, consultation with interested bodies by means of a number of topic groups. This would be followed by the issuing of proposals for formal consultation in about 12--18 months time and it is hoped that new regulations might be implemented from 1 January 1999. Major issues for consultation will include the possible integration of related regulations (e.g. IRR85, POPUMET, Outside Workers Regs.), the status of the ACOP and the averaging period for the public dose limit (a simple single year limit or a more flexible 5 year average). The Patient Protection Directive is also scheduled for revision, with negotiations starting this summer under the lead of the Department of Health: proposed changes cover the restriction of unnecessary medical exposures, the delegation of responsibility, training and the implementation of QA programmes.

The trio of presentations from the HSE was concluded by James Taylor (HSE, Home Counties Region) who gave guidance on the use of Local Rules. Local Rules are a statutory requirement under Regulation 11 of IRR85 whose function is to enable work to be conducted in compliance with the Regulations. They should not be too detailed but should comprise a clear and concise outline with reference to more detailed instructions, such as operating manuals or dispensing procedures, which should be available more locally. The Local Rules must specify the arrangements for cooperation between employers and for the handover of responsibility (for instance, handing over temporary control of equipment to a contractor). They must contain a list of all the RPAs and RPSs (and how to contact them) and of all Controlled and Supervised Areas (for example, by room number). The written System of Work, by which non-classified workers may enter and work in Controlled Areas, should include details of the arrangements for dose monitoring. Other items which should be specified include an ALARA statement, training standards for workers, accounting and storage arrangements for radioactive sources, contingency plans, reporting arrangements (e.g. for the overexposure of patients), critical examination of new equipment and reference to other relevant regulations (e.g. POPUMET, OWR). It was emphasised that the appointed RPS, whose duty it was to ensure compliance of workers with the Local Rules, must have adequate management authority to enforce them.

This was a very useful meeting, well earthed in practical considerations, and it was encouraging to hear a generally realistic approach to both the practice and the regulation of radiation safety.

Ian Davies, Don Hancock, Alan Simpson

142

Cavendish Conference Centre, London, 27 February 1996

Exemption and clearance levels is a phrase that seems to have become ingrained on my mind of late, such is the growing interest in the subject. The more one thinks about it, the more issues and concerns there seem to be, and what it sometimes seems could once have been solved over a cup of coffee and half a side of A4 now involves many different organisations, groups and interests (local, national and international). The subject is an important one that has significant implications for all of us and, for this reason, SRP undertook to arrange a workshop. The intention was for representatives of all of the interested parties to exchange information on current developments in the area, and identify priority issues and implications.

John Croft (NRPB) had volunteered to act as Chairman, and opened the workshop by noting that although the subject covered some sensitive areas, he hoped the event would have an informal nature where issues could be aired and the participants could learn from each other. John noted that the day was split into two sessions. The morning session was centred on the problems and challenges faced by users, whilst the afternoon was given over to discussion of the way forward in the light of recent Directives, Government statements and developing international guidance.

Starting the morning session, Tony Richards (University of Leeds) noted that the most useful exemption level for Research, Teaching Establishments and Hospitals is that for Very Low Level Waste (VLLW), commonly called the `dustbin' limit. However, this presents some difficulties, primarily because of the need to find enough non-active refuse to meet the associated dilution requirements, which can make its use unrealistic for the volumes that need to be disposed of. In this case, the costs of alternative disposal can be significant and so these Establishments would welcome a more realistic system.

During the subsequent discussion, John Croft wondered whether the difficulties that were being experienced in using the VLLW order arose because waste was not being properly segregated at source. Tony agreed that this can be a problem, both in ensuring that segregation criteria had been applied correctly, and in finding the resources to actually do it. Also, there is a conflict because the desire to segregate waste to ensure control conflicts with the desire to dilute activities by dispersing wastes. The difficulties of using the VLLW exemption order were echoed by other delegates, primarily because of the seemingly perverse need for the highest level of QA for the lowest level of waste, which again makes disposal by this route expensive. For the regulatory community, John Hetherington (HMIPI) noted that although the VLLW figures may be reviewed, and there may be opportunity to relax the figures for certain nuclides, it was by no means certain that this would be the case generally, and some may need to be tightened.

Representing the hospital sector, Cathy Griffiths (Royal Hallamshire Hospital) commenced by summarising the changes to the Hospitals Exemption Order that would be welcome. Amongst other things, this now requires waste to be accumulated for a maximum period of only two weeks, which in turn means that partially filled containers are being sent for incineration at premium prices. There are no provisions covering gaseous waste disposal, even though this may be a discharge route from, for example, patients undergoing 14C breath tests, and the draft revised Euratom Basic Safety Standards gives a total activity for exemption (from reporting and authorisation) for 14C of 107 Bq. Similarly, and as for other sectors, there is no liquid equivalent to the 0.4 Bq g-1 exemption level for solids that was incorporated within RSA60 even though, again, there are potential discharge routes. Referring to the proposed BSS Annex 1 figures, Cathy welcomed the potential flexibility, but noted that the proposed limits for nuclides such as 133Xe were much more restrictive than those for other commonly used nuclides. Keith White (West Middlesex University Hospital) put forward the view, supported by many present, that directing so much resources at such trivial levels of activity did not make sense when compared against the real issues of life and death present in this sector. In summary, Cathy made a plea for a review of the method used to determine exemption levels so that these were logical, consistent and realistic and perhaps based on Annual Limits of Intakes, or some other rational basis.

Representing the industrial sector (excluding the Nuclear Industry), Ciaran McDonnell (NRPB) noted, as may be expected, that commercial considerations are the primary decision drivers for users. Concern mainly focuses on the need to avoid liabilities that could interfere with future uses (and hence saleability) of the site such as any need to register the site. For this reason, small users often approach such situations simply by disposing of any item that is even mildly contaminated (rather than attempting decontamination) using, for example, the VLLW or Phosphatic Substances Exemption Order (for contaminated soil from luminising sites). This may involve dumping significant amounts of material such as soil, concrete and so on which, whilst no significant problems are encountered, may not utilise resources effectively.

In terms of the way forward, Ciaran noted that any changes to the two most relevant EOs (Exemption Orders) mentioned above may create problems for industrial users. Also, guidance on whether RSA93 applies to contaminated land as well as `waste' would be welcome. What was to become a recurring theme - the question of whether the current exemption levels are set at the right levels, or whether they are appropriate to all situations including, for example, the possible re-use of land from industrial sites for other activities or housing projects was also raised.

The last user representative of the day was Graeme Stonell (UKAEA), who represented the nuclear industry. Graeme started by highlighting the usefulness of the Exemption Orders, and in particular the Substances of Low Activity Order, which is very useful, but again makes no provision for liquid wastes and is not nuclide specific which would be a worthwhile change. If the EOs are to be reviewed or replaced, then the result should ideally be based on genuine hazard and also needs to be practicable. This latter point had been made in one form or another all morning - exemption levels as currently set are at or near the capability of detection, which in turn means that waste often has to be sent via costly disposal routes simply because the very low activity contents cannot be measured.

The current constraints on recycling and re-use follow on naturally from this. Reflecting the views given by Ciaran McDonnell, industry would like to be able to recycle materials, rather than dispose of them, but requirements in this area are not clear or consistent. Views and guidance are starting to emerge, but any system needs to be sufficiently realistic to allow re-use rather than force disposal, which again comes back to a need to use realistic models that reflect the practicalities of real life.

As with the industrial sector, the issues pertaining to the re-use of land present an increasingly pressing problem for the industry. The problems are, in general terms, very similar to those being experienced by other sectors - for example, what criteria are appropriate for assessing land, and how can this be done at reasonable cost. Over and above these, however, is the need for NII to be satisfied that there would be no danger from ionising radiations as a result of a site being delicensed. In summary, all of these questions impact heavily on the industry, and considerations that seem simple in themselves, such as the modelling criteria used to determine clearance or exemption levels, can have far-reaching effects. To avoid this, Graeme ended with an overall plea for end-users to be consulted during the formation of figures and policy, rather than after these have been developed.

Ending the morning session, Joe McHugh (HMIP) noted that Regulators have to remain impartial whilst ensuring, so far as possible, that users choose disposal methods which conserve the capacity of national facilities such as Drigg (although one delegate noted the potential for conflict in these aims). Joe suggested that regulators welcome being involved in discussion about clearance and exemption issues for individual projects at an early stage, and try, for example, to ensure that future uses of sites or cleared materials do not pose unacceptable risks. Referring to the earlier comments on methods of compliance with exemption levels, he said that the best way of dealing with this was to discuss it with the relevant Inspector. Finally, he suggested that there may be tendency to classify wastes from active areas as active even when they are not, and there may therefore be some benefit in trying to avoid this.

The afternoon session was given over to Government and NRPB to describe how the system might develop and address some of the difficulties identified. John Cooper (NRPB) started by summarising references to exemption within ICRP60, the draft revision of the Euratom BSS and the IAEA BSS. Numeric criteria for exemption levels had previously been developed by IAEA/NEA with the aim of ensuring that radiological protection, including the cost of regulatory control, was optimised. These criteria were an annual individual dose of no more than 10 µSv from each exempt practice and a collective dose commitment from one year of unregulated practice of no more than 1 man Sv. Models were then developed to reflect a range of scenarios, and in doing so it was identified that there was a need to have an additional criterion, namely that skin doses did not exceed 50 mSv y-1. The aim was to develop a system whereby small users (such as hospitals) could be exempt from reporting and authorisation where appropriate.

John briefly summarised the variety of work currently going on to formulate suitable proposals for clearance regimes, but noted that all of the groups involved agree that clearance levels must be set at levels less than or equal to exemption levels. These too were based on an assumption that 10 µSv per year could be taken to be a trivial individual dose level. Roger Coates (BNFL) questioned the blanket application of this dose level, and suggested that at these levels, a few tens of µSv would be a better interpretation that would allow flexibility, and in any event there should be a different (higher) level should be applied to workers. Echoing the morning speakers, Roger made a plea for end-users to have the opportunity to review the models that were being developed to set exemption and clearance levels. John Croft wondered, as a final point on this particular subject, whether the system used to develop the models places too much emphasis on the use of conservative parameters at each stage, and therefore ends up making the system too restrictive.

Robert Jackson (Department of the Environment) then spoke about the regulatory implications of the Euratom BSS Directive and the recent White Paper on Waste Management. Summarising the current UK regulatory position, Robert noted that users must notify HSE of the intention to work with radioactive material and register or obtain authorisation from HMIP under RSA93. It is worthy of note that these two requirements are for fundamentally different purposes - the first is essentially to aid protection of workers, whilst the second is aimed at the regulation of waste management. Exemptions from both of these requirements are possible, the first through, for example, schedule 2 of the IRRs and the second via the exemption levels specified for certain naturally occurring radionuclides in Schedule 1 of RSA93 and the RSA Exemption Orders. Studies of the RSA EOs had indicated that whilst they are useful (for example by allowing material to be cleared from sites using the VLLW EO), and their use results in negligible exposures, there is little consistency either in strategy or derivation.

Turning to the draft BSS Directive, Robert described the system contained within that Directive. This is broadly similar to the current system, i.e. it requires notification and authorisation for a number of specified operations as well as other cases where the exemption levels given in Annex 1 are exceeded. However, a specific article covers the authorisation needed for the disposal, recycling and re-use of active materials from practices that themselves require authorisation. The key point here is that this requirement may be waived if clearance levels established by the national Competent Authorities are complied with (such levels must, however, follow the general criteria used to determine the Annex 1 figures). The Directive also makes provision for the protection of workers from enhanced levels of natural radiation, although again with some possibility for exemption. In summary, Robert noted that the Directive had ended up framed in a manner that would allow the current UK system to be maintained, although the precise manner of implementation, and hence its effects, had yet to be determined. Nevertheless, DOE intends to carry out a review of the RSA EOs including their derivation and although the overall intention is to minimise the regulatory burden, there may well be winners and losers.

Ending the afternoon session, Mick Bacon (Health and Safety Executive) started off a debate on the means and criteria by which nuclear sites can be delicensed. As noted earlier, HSE have a responsibility to be satisfied that there is no danger from ionising radiations before a site can be delicensed, and there is currently no formal consensus on exactly what this term means in practice. Until this is formalised, applications for delicensing are being dealt with on a case by case basis, with the responsibility being put on site management to show that this condition has been met. Many delegates suggested that HSE should be able to base decisions on their Tolerability of Risk (ToR) philosophy. Iain Devine (Magnox Electric), supported by a number of other attendees, noted that a return to a `greenfield' site may not necessarily be the best option for `UK plc' and that there may, perhaps, be other options open, such as conditional delicensing for specific activities.

The day seemed useful to all of those who attended. Obviously, no firm conclusions had been reached, but the problems and difficulties faced by users had been aired, and it was interesting to note the common threads that affected all of the sectors using radioactive materials. These essentially consisted of the problems experienced as a result of increasingly trivial and sometimes unrealistic figures being set as exemption or clearance levels which, together with the associated difficulties in monitoring, sometimes drive the user to dispose of material inappropriately at significant expense. The widespread uses of the RSA Exemption Orders were described and finally the growing need for clear and consistent criteria on how to delicense sites was highlighted. The Regulators gave useful summaries of how the criteria had been developed, and how they might develop in future. I am sure they were interested to listen to the real problems being experienced, and will be able to feed this knowledge into future consideration of the subject.

I think all of us at the workshop were aware that a great many people have a strong interest in this subject, and that many more would have attended the workshop if places had been available. I am conscious of the heavy burden on me to report on the workshop in a manner that suitably captures the major points of the day. Many ideas and thoughts were put forward, and a full summary would probably take up the whole of this journal - nevertheless I hope that I have managed to capture the gist of the meeting. I would like to thank all of those who were involved, and in particular the speakers, John Croft and SRP generally for what proved to be a good day.

Perhaps it is appropriate to end on a thought put forward by Roger Coates that echoes my comments in the opening paragraph. Roger has a dream - supported by many I'm sure - that over the next few years we can end up with a system that has a single set of numbers for unconditional clearance and exemption that are technically reasonable. These would be based on the BSS Annex 1 values, have 1 Bq g-1 as a minimum value and be consistent with surface contamination levels of 0.4 Bq cm-2 α/ 4 Bq cm-2 β which are currently in widespread use, both in the UK and the rest of the world. Perhaps there may be higher levels for conditional clearances, but it's a good target to aim for during the revision of guidance and legislation that is planned. Wouldn't life be nice...

D K Owen

BOOK REVIEWS

019

1. In 1984 the report of the Black Advisory Group confirmed an increased incidence of leukaemia in young people in Seascale but concluded that radiation doses from Sellafield discharges could not account for this. In 1985 the Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment (COMARE) was formed to assess and advise Government on the health effects of radiation in the environment. Their fourth report, published on 27 March 1996, reviews the epidemiological, dosimetric and other scientific data relating to Seascale and the Sellafield nuclear site which has become available since the Black Report and COMARE's first report. A major aim of the report was to draw conclusions about the main advances in scientific knowledge since the time of the Black Report and to clarify where progress had been made and where uncertainties remain.

2. COMARE have examined the incidence of cancer among young people age 0 - 24 living in the vicinity of Sellafield for the period 1955 to 1992. This was subdivided into the period examined by the Black Advisory Group (1963 to 1983), the period following publication of the Black report (1984 to 1992) and the earlier period 1955 to 1962 (for which comparable statistical analysis is not possible) in order to see whether the raised incidence of malignant disease in young people identified by Black had persisted. COMARE established that there has been a continuing excess of leukaemia and other cancers in 0 - 24 year olds in Seascale Ward in the post-Black period 1984 - 1992 (observed = 5, expected = 0.78, O/E = 6.4) primarily due to an excess of acute lymphoblastic leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma (NHL). Taken together with the results for the earlier period 1955 - 62 (for which comparable statistical analysis is not possible) and 1963 - 1983 (O = 6, E = 2.18, O/E = 2.75), the data show that there has been a continued excess of leukaemia and NHL in Seascale for four decades. Such evidence as COMARE had did not indicate any excess between 1900 and 1945.

3. COMARE have investigated possible causes of the excess and concluded: 3.1. On current knowledge, environmental radiation exposure from authorised or unplanned releases could not account for the excess. Much work has been done to reduce the uncertainties present in the previous assessment although some uncertainties do still remain.

3.2. On current knowledge occupational exposure to radiation is very unlikely to account for the excess. COMARE considered two possible mechanisms by which parental occupation could increase the risk of cancer in their offspring; preconception effect through irradiation of the gonads (the Gardner hypothesis) and unrecognised pathways of exposure via workers, e.g. whereby radioactive material was inadvertently removed from the site (the evidence from three studies performed on housedust in houses in Seascale indicate that radionuclides in housedust in Seascale are not likely to be a significant source of dose). COMARE note that there is a plausible genetic and mechanistic basis for a Paternal Preconception Irradiation (PPI) effect, but concluded that the level of risk implied by this explanation is inconsistent with the radiation doses actually received via occupational exposure and current estimates of genetic risk. Although there are uncertainties regarding internal radiation exposures it is not clear how these could affect the population of Seascale and not the other residents of small towns and villages nearby where workers from the Sellafield site also live.

3.3. Environmental exposure to chemicals is unlikely to offer an explanation for the observed excess of childhood leukaemia in Seascale, although the data in this area are sparse.

3.4. Other possible factors existing in the locality before the establishment of the Sellafield nuclear site were also investigated and whether there was any sign of an elevated childhood cancer or leukaemia rate in Seascale before the site was developed. An analysis of the death certificates for the period 1900 - 1945 has shown that there was no evidence of an excess of childhood cancer or leukaemia in this part of Cumbria during that period. It was not possible to demonstrate any associations with other local factors or why they should be confined to the village of Seascale.

3.5. COMARE believe that population mixing is a factor in the increase in childhood leukaemias described in some population groups. Therefore, it follows that the excess childhood leukaemia incidence in Seascale is likely to be causally associated, at least in part, with related demographic factors such as geographic isolation and mixing between residents who have migrated from different areas, or additional exposure to infections such as from sewage outflow. Such factors may reflect the involvement of transmissible infectious agents in the aetiology of childhood leukaemia. However, the evidence available at present does not convince COMARE that such a large relative risk persisting over more than three decades could be wholly attributed to population mixing.

4. Overall, COMARE concluded that the excess of leukaemia and NHL in young people in Seascale for the period 1963 to 1992 is highly unlikely to be due to chance alone. Various factors considered above could affect the incidence of leukaemia and NHL but no one factor alone could account for the increase. COMARE cannot rule out interactions between different possible factors but, as yet, have no way of quantifying their effects nor of saying why the interaction would be unique to Seascale.

5. COMARE have made a number of recommendations arising from their investigation. They see no benefit from continuing to investigate Seascale in isolation, in the absence of new evidence of particular causative characteristics which could be relevant to the Seascale cases. Specific recommendations arising from their findings are: 5.1. A number of epidemiological studies underway which will examine the various hypotheses discussed in the report should be supported to completion;

5.2. the incidence of leukaemia and other cancers in the area be kept under surveillance and reviewed periodically by the appropriate authorities, and that any new cases of leukaemia or other cancer be fully characterised;

5.3. the mortality/incidence of both childhood and adult leukaemia and other cancers in Seascale for the years 1946 - 62 be examined as thoroughly as possible to connect the mortality study of 1900 - 45 with the incidence studies of 1963 - 92

5.4. innovative research should be supported, wherever possible, in relation to the uncertainties identified by COMARE's investigation in areas of internal radiation exposures where an urgent need exists for improved knowledge. COMARE consider that their investigation is both important for the scientific basis of radiation protection generally and for the evaluation of potential future problems in the field of radiation and public health;

5.5. high quality innovative research regarding the causes of childhood leukaemia, especially where it permits hypothesis testing, should be supported wherever possible, that this should be considered a necessary part of the remit of radiation protection, and that there should be continued liaison between funding bodies to ensure that essential research receives adequate priority for available funds.

020

The authors intend the book to be an introduction to the field of radiation protection dosimetry. Having just been published last year, the book is able to take into account all the changes and developments that have come in recent ICRP and ICRU reports. The book is aimed at graduate students or as a reference work for professionals in the field. I have to admit to disliking the typeface used and this is a pity as the standard of illustrations included are very good, I particularly liked the illustration of expanded and expanded and aligned fields.

The book is divided into two parts; the first part deals with radiation quantities and units as defined by the ICRU and ICRP. The material is covered in a similar manner to the way it is presented in the ICRU documents with a small amount of further explanation. All the important quantities are covered including operational quantities and a discussion on microdosimetry. Most quantities are well explained although it is a shame that only half a page was devoted to Personal Dose Equivalent. It would have been good to see slightly more explanation on the use and measurement of this quantity and the relationship between and EDE.

The book is intended as a teaching text and so care should have been taken not to include misleading information. For example, in discussing indirectly ionising radiation the authors state that photons do not cause ionisation, this is not true and could cause confusion in a student new to the field. Mislabelling the Radiation Weighting Factor as throughout one section does not help.

The second part of the book deals with the levels of radiation exposure to the public and radiation workers from natural and man-made sources. The section on natural sources covers exposure of the public to extra-terrestrial sources, terrestrial sources and a 20 page section on radon. This is followed by information on population exposures to man-made sources with sections covering power production, nuclear weapon testing, radionuclide production and uses, consumer products, accidents and medical and industrial uses.

Occupational radiation doses are covered for workers in the fuel cycle and power production, defence activities, industry and medicine. Most of the data in the second half of the book is gleaned from the UNSCEAR reports, however, a long table of references is given making it a good starting point for further study. It is a pity that the risks associated with these exposures are not discussed. The only section on risk assessment is one page at the end of the first section; however the current ICRP risk estimates are given if not discussed.

Would I recommend this book? Yes if you do not have access to ICRU, ICRP and UNSCEAR reports and want to have the definitions of radiation quantities at your fingertips. Otherwise at nearly £50 it could be a useful addition to a student library.

021

The issue of classification of waste is important as it ultimately defines what can be done with particular types of waste. Existing classification systems tend to be based on halflives and concentrations of certain radionuclides; however many waste streams contain hazardous chemicals and hence should be termed mixed waste. If mixed waste is to be properly managed then a system is needed that deals with radioactive and chemical hazards in a comparable manner and hence a risk based system has been proposed. The aim of the symposium was to identify the key issues to be addressed in a risk based system.

The scope of the book is wide, covering the need for a risk based system, the biology of risk, risks from radionuclides and conventional chemicals and social and political considerations. As such it provides a useful introduction to the subject. However, it does go on to address the practical application of a risk based system and describes two risk based methodologies. The risk assessment part is very simple: it is essentially a series of attenuation factors to represent leaching, migration and dilution, and brings home the fact that the same models can be used for radioactive and chemical pollutants. However, it is incomplete: it does not consider the risks from other pathways, e.g. intrusion into the disposal site and it does not address the issue of using the same criteria for radioactive and chemical pollutants. (Essentially it compares the predicted concentration in drinking water with the EPA drinking water limit.)

The final section gives a very interesting list of the advantages and disadvantages of a risk based system. It appears that although it would provide a mechanism for harmonising standards for radioactive and chemical wastes, it would disrupt the current regulatory system, cause delays in establishing new disposal facilities, and lead to extensive and unproductive debates on the robustness of risk assessments. The reader is left to decide between neatness and practicality.

022

The topic dealt with in this book is mandated science which means applied science brought to bear on practical issues such as risk assessment. Most readers of the Journal of Radiological Protection would likely consider risk assessment to be objective and value free, but it is just this feature that the authors of this engaging book set about to undermine. In short, the notion that mandated science provides neutral, value-free advice is often mistaken, as is illustrated by a detailed consideration of the alachlor controversy in Canada.

Alachlor is a chemical herbicide manufactured by Monsanto and used to control weeds in fields planted with corn and soya beans. Prior to being made commercially available, chemicals such as alachlor require registration by Agriculture Canada. The issue of their safety is dealt with by the Canadian Department of Health and Welfare. Establishing the safety of chemicals like alachlor requires a dose-response curve for the induction of tumours in animal studies, as well as an assessment of the exposures to the workers who will be handling these chemicals during their routine work activities.

In the mid-80s, the Canadian government concluded that Alachlor posed too high a risk of cancer. Monsanto appealed this decision, and the Alachlor Review Board was convened to consider the appeal during 1986 - 87. Although the Review Board concluded that alachlor was not a risky product, and should be registered to permit its legal sale in Canada, this recommendation by the Board was rejected by the Minister. As a consequence of this government decision, alachlor is no longer commercially available in Canada.

Of particular interest were the large differences between the risks of alachlor as determined by the manufacturer (Monsanto) as compared to those of the Department of Health and Welfare. Based on the same empirical data, the risk estimates made by the commercial company and the health authorities disagreed due to different assumptions made about the exposure to agricultural workers. The most intriguing conclusion of this study, however, is that these differences arose from the fact that the two sides held different value perspectives. Included in this category were issues such as the importance of technology, the relative importance of human health and corporate profits, their political philosophy (e.g. liberalism) as well as the nature of rationality itself.

In the case of alachlor, conflicting risk estimates differed by as much as six orders of magnitude because of different assumptions made about issues such as whether the workers would be using protective clothing (gloves) and the exposure measurement methodology (patch tests versus biomonitoring). These issues may be considered to be conditionally or inherently normative and value laden decisions were required before any full blown risk estimate could be made. Retreat by the assessors to simply providing a range of risks which differed by would have rendered any assessment of no practical value for any regulatory purpose.

This key facet of risk assessment can be illustrated by looking at the issue of protective clothing, where the question is whether it should be assumed that the worker will wear protective gloves. Not surprisingly, Monsanto assumed workers would be wearing such gloves, an approach which minimised the risk to the company's economic freedom and financial position. Since Health and Welfare has the mandate of health protection, their choice was that workers would not wear gloves. The glove issue was not purely factual but normative; it contrasted the fairness to the company (why should Monsanto be penalised if workers did not obey the instructions provided) versus health (Health and Welfare noted that gloves were in fact generally not worn by workers).

The point that the authors are making is that the risk assessment of alachlor is not merely an empirical and factual exercise. When computing risk estimates in the real world, there are usually uncertainties in the underlying science. For example, it is not clear that the induction of tumours in a rat following exposure to a chemical will also result in tumours to humans at similar exposure levels. It is the manner of dealing with these types of scientific (and other) uncertainties that can cause real difficulties in a risk assessment exercise. Proponents of risk assessment are frequently mistaken when they make claims of objectivity. In the alachlor controversy, the scientific mindset represented by the conclusion of the review Board was in reality the hegemony of one set of values dressed up to appear value neutral and scientifically objective. It is important to emphasise that the authors are not denying the need for good science in risk assessment, but that such an exercise involves much more than just establishing `the facts'.

The implications of this study are that disagreements about issues such as nuclear power are often normative in nature and not purely factual. A corollary is that any satisfactory resolution of such debates needs to focus on the normative aspects. It is a mistake to pretend that a search for objective `facts' about the risks is likely to resolve such differences and although there may be differences of fact which require attention, these are likely to be minor in comparison to the normative issues. If the case the authors are making were to be generally accepted, then many in the risk assessment business would need to review their methodology and identify the points at which their expertise runs out and value predilections take over.

The issue of risk assessment is of major significance for all who work in the field of radiological protection. The arguments and conclusions presented in this book may be disturbing to many health physicists who believe their role in risk assessment to be neutral and purely objective. In this reviewer's opinion, the authors have made a substantive case that risk assessment per se is a much more complex business than hitherto believed to be the case. It appears that risk assessment, as well as any subsequent issues of the acceptability of any risks, impinge on the political realm where conflicting societal demands need to be resolved. The notion that the issue of risk assessment can be resolved by invoking a neutral and objective `algorithm' to yield a rational (and therefore acceptable) answer is apparently misguided.

The arguments in this book are clearly presented and the topic is of obvious importance for the health physics profession. If the authors' conclusions on this important topic were to be generally accepted, then those involved with risk assessment would face an important professional choice. Risk assessors could stay out of normative issues and offer watered down versions emphasising uncertainties and how the risk depends on underlying assumptions. Whether such assessments would be of any practical benefit is clearly problematical. Any submission of a comprehensive risk assessment, on the other hand, would need to recognise that these also express value commitments. Obviously such values could not be claimed to be supported by any underlying scientific expertise. Whether one agrees or disagrees with these conclusions, reading this book is an important step towards a deeper understanding of the fundamental issues unearthed by this meticulous scrutiny of the alachlor controversy.

001

All the best ideas start as heresies and end as being self-evident; they pass through phases of being shocking, stimulating and soporific. This is now so well known that your eyelids may already be dropping slow.

As I write this the BSE scandal has reached phase 4. Phase 1 (Recognition) followed immediately upon publication of some work that showed that there just might be a link between BSE and a particular form of CJD. The link is based on a few cases that may originate from beef handled some years ago under less strict rules. The media showed those pictures of shivering desperate cows and interviewed mothers whose sons had died of CJD. It proved difficult to understand in the subsequent fierce debate what the actual likelihood of a link was. There seems no real vocabulary of risk. On the one hand, people were saying that we want none of this beef unless it is absolutely safe. On the other, ministers were saying that beef was safe in the common usage of the term.

Phase 2 (Reaction) followed swiftly and people stopped buying beef. Empty cattle markets dominated the news and the British beef industry was seen as close to collapse. The industry told us how safe British beef was. A Government minister almost ate a beefburger but declined because she had dined earlier. The issue moved from questions of what the real risk was to one of public confidence.

Phase 3 (Response) was but a day or so away. The Slaughter of the Cows was the solution. Visions of some bovine hell emerged with the national herd going up in smoke.

And now, just today, it's Phase 4 (Retreat?). Cheaper beef is on the shelves and is selling. Slaughtering cows seems a little unnecessary. The scientific basis for the panic - fragile it was - is being undermined. People in other countries apparently ate beef from cows that had been fed on processed sheep remains; we had exported this nutritious snack to them.

Now this is, quite obviously, cost - benefit analysis and optimisation in action in the real world. The perceived risk, weighted for severity of consequence and probability and allowing for the delay in onset of the disease after consumption, was balanced against the cost to individuals and society of instituting protective measures. We have seen a number of alarms pass through these phases.

Radon and power lines has little life left in it. It should be a hot favourite to run and run because it is radiation-related but it suffers from being too technical. It will no doubt rumble on in the impenetrable thickets of the journals but seems unlikely to break out onto the Great Plains again so that everyone can watch the sport. Possibly faulty testing for AIDS caused some disturbance (one in ten thousand tests may give a false negative); it lasted but a day or two. The COMARE report on Sellafield childhood leukaemias never really took off as a media event; suggesting that there is something not to worry about if you live near Sellafield is not big news apparently.

The four-phase pattern seems to apply to just about any public activity that involves risk assessment; public debate seems unable to handle it.

Dog bites man is not news; man bites dog is. Where does `There is a Probability of One in a Thousand that Dog will Bite Man in 20 Years Time' fit in?

Geoff Meggitt

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Figure 1. Monty Charles

It is indeed an honour and privilege to serve the SRP as President, particularly when I look back at the many well known previous incumbents who have made such a major contribution to radiological protection in general and to the status of the Society in particular. The President is, however, only a figurehead who acts as a coordinator of Council's views. Council in turn are steering a ship which is manned by SRP Members. It is your enthusiasm and involvement which drives the society forward to achieve its aims. The past year has been one of considerable re-evaluation by Council of the objectives of the Society and several task groups have been initiated to brings these to fruition. In particular, the society is aiming to achieve a wider and more varied scientific programme, to improve international links particularly with IRPA, and to improve information flow to members on a range of radiological protection topics. Some of the initiatives recently made by Council will take several years to see through and their success is dependent upon members giving of their time, energy and enthusiasm. It is especially important that younger members are involved in these activities to provide continuity and balance. If you wish to be involved in the process of shaping the future of the Society make this known to the SRP Secretary. This involvement often requires the authorisation of senior managers and we continue to be dependent upon and grateful to the individuals and organisations who can see the long term advantages of a healthy and independent radiological protection community in the UK.

I am taking up the Presidency at the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, in the midst of a series of scientific meetings reviewing its impact in terms of health effects and public perception of radiation risks. My attendance at some of these meetings has underlined to me the fact that radiological protection is about people. Up to now statistically significant increases in radiation-related health effects from Chernobyl have been limited to thyroid cancer in the most heavily contaminated areas. However, there is very increased concern regarding non-specific radiation-related health effects, particularly for those evacuated from the strict controlled zones, which brings with it a reduction in quality of life which is real and cannot be ignored. Some have suggested that the only antidote is a `triangular' dialogue between `scientists/administrators' and the general public, with three interacting and essential characteristics of openness, honesty and discussion. That would not be a bad motto for a radiation protection society or for us all as individual practitioners. Only this will allow radiation risks to be put into perspective and enable mutual understanding and trust to be re-established. The aims and ambitions of the SRP are part of that process and I would be well satisfied if during the next year we moved forward at least some way in that direction.

Monty Charles

Council 1996/97 16 No 2 (June 1996) 71-72

Council 1996/97

President

M W Charles

President Elect

M J Minski

Past President

R Coates

Hon Secretary

A Knight

Hon Treasurer

M C Renouf

Non-voting Members

P F Beaver (Chairman, Qualifications & Professional Standards Committee) M Marshall (Scientific Programme Secretary) G C Meggitt (Journal Editor) H C Orchard (Chairman, Membership Committee)

Council Members

P J Allisy-Roberts B P Bleasdale D B Drury (Associate Representative) E P Goldfinch (Affiliate Representative) G J Hunt P E Powell K B Shaw R I Storrie